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Abstract. In this work the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel AVWC
is studied. We derive a lower bound on the random code secrecy capac-
ity for the average error criterion and the strong secrecy criterion in the
case of a best channel to the eavesdropper by using Ahlswede’s robus-
tification technique for ordinary AVCs. We show that in the case of a
non-symmetrisable channel to the legitimate receiver the deterministic
code secrecy capacity equals the random code secrecy capacity, a result
similar to Ahlswede’s dichotomy result for ordinary AVCs. Using this we
can derive that the lower bound is also valid for the deterministic code
capacity of the AVWC. The proof of the dichotomy result is based on
the elimination technique introduced by Ahlswede for ordinary AVCs.
We further prove upper bounds on the deterministic code secrecy ca-
pacity in the general case, which results in a multi-letter expression for
the secrecy capacity in the case of a best channel to the eavesdropper.
Using techniques of Ahlswede, developed to guarantee the validity of a
reliability criterion, the main contribution of this work is to integrate the
strong secrecy criterion into these techniques.
1 Introduction
Models of communication systems taking into account both the requirement
of security against a potential eavesdropper and reliable information transmis-
sion to legitimate receivers which suffer from channel uncertainty, have received
much interest in current research. One of the simplest communication models
with channel uncertainty are compound channels, where the channel realisation
remains fixed during the whole transmission of a codeword. Compound wiretap
channels were the topic of previous work of the authors [7], [8] and for example
of [13], [9]. In the model of an arbitrarily varying wiretap channel AVWC the
channel state to both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper varies from
symbol to symbol in an unknown and arbitrary manner. Thus apart from eaves-
dropping the model takes into account an active adversarial jamming situation in
which the jammer chooses the states at her/his will. Then reliable transmission
to the legitimate receiver must be guaranteed in the presence of the jammer.
In this paper we consider families of pairs of channels W = {(Wsn , Vsn) :
sn ∈ Sn} with common input alphabets and possibly different output alpha-
bets, where sn ∈ Sn denotes the state sequence during the transmission of a
codeword. The legitimate users are connected via Wsn and the eavesdropper
observes the output of Vsn . In our communication scenario the legitimate users
have no channel state information. We derive capacity results for the AVWC
W under the average error probability criterion and a strong secrecy criterion.
The investigation of the corresponding problem concerning the maximum error
criterion is left as a subject of future investigations. However, we should em-
phasize that there is no full capacity result for an ordinary (i.e. without secrecy
constraints) AVC for the maximum error criterion. Together with Wolfowitz in
[5] Ahlswede determined the capacity for AVCs with binary output alphabets
under this criterion. In [1] he showed that the general solution is connected to
Shannon’s zero error capacity problem [15].
Two fundamental techniques, called elimination and robustification technique
discovered by Ahlswede will play a crucial role in this paper. In [2] he developed
the elimination technique to derive the deterministic code capacity for AVCs
under the average error probability criterion, which is either zero or equals its
random code capacity, a result, which is called Ahlswede’s dichotomy for sin-
gle user AVCs. With the so-called robustification technique [6] in turn he could
link random codes for the AVC to deterministic codes for compound channels.
Further in the papers [3], [4] on common randomness in information theory
Ahlswede together with Csiszar studied, inter alia, problems of information the-
oretic security by considering a model which enables secret sharing of a random
key, in particular in the presence of a wiretapper. Because the arbitrarily varying
wiretap channel AVWC combines both the wiretap channel and the AVC it is
not surprising that we can use the aforementioned techniques to derive capac-
ity results for the AVWC. The actual challenge of our work was to integrate
the strong secrecy criterion in both the elimination and the robustification tech-
nique, approaches, both were developed to guarantee a reliability criterion. As
it was shown in [8], compared with weaker secrecy criteria, the strong secrecy
criterion ensures that the average error probability of every decoding strategy
of the eavesdropper in the limit tends to one.
In Section 3.2 we give a lower bound on the random code secrecy capacity in
the special case of a ”best” channel to the eavesdropper. The proof is based on the
robustification technique by Ahlswede [6] combined with results for compound
wiretap channels given by the authors in [8].
In Section 3.3 we use the elimination technique [2], which is composed of the
random code reduction and the elimination of randomness [10], to show that,
provided that the channel to the legitimate receiver is non-symmetrisable, the
deterministic code secrecy capacity equals the random code secrecy capacity and
to give a condition when it is greater than zero. Thus we establish a result for the
AVWC that is similar to that of Ahlswede’s dichotomy result for ordinary AVCs.
As a consequence the above-mentioned lower bound on the random code secrecy
capacity can be achieved by a deterministic code under the same assumptions.
In Section 3.4 we give a single-letter upper bound on the deterministic code
secrecy capacity, which corresponds to the upper bound of the secrecy capacity
of a compound wiretap channel. Moreover, by establishing an multi-letter upper
bound on the secrecy capacity we can conclude to a multi-letter expression of
the secrecy capacity of the AVWC in the special case of a best channel to the
eavesdropper.
The lower bound on the secrecy capacity as well as other results were given
earlier in [14] for a weaker secrecy criterion, but the proof techniques for the
stronger secrecy criterion differ significantly, especially in the achievability part
for the random codes.
2 Arbitrarily Varying Wiretap Channels
2.1 Definitions
Let A,B,C be finite sets and consider a non-necessarily finite family of channels
Ws : A → P(B)
1, where s ∈ S denotes the state of the channel. Now, given
sn = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S
n we define the stochastic matrix
Wn(yn|xn, sn) :=
n∏
i=1
W (yi|xi, si) :=
n∏
i=1
Wsi (yi|xi) (1)
for all yn = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ B
n and xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A
n. An arbitrarily vary-
ing channel is then defined as the sequence {Wn}∞n=1 of the family of channels
Wn = {Wn(·|·, sn) : sn ∈ Sn}. Now letWn represent the communication link to
a legitimate receiver to which the transmitter wants to send a private message,
such that a possible second receiver should be kept as ignorant of that message
as possible. We call this receiver the eavesdropper, which observes the output of
a second family of channels Vn = {V n(·|·, sn) : sn ∈ Sn} with an analogue defi-
nition of V n(·|·, sn) as in (1) for Vs : A→ P(C), s ∈ S. Then we denote the set of
the two families of channels with common input by W = {(Wsn , Vsn) : s
n ∈ Sn}
and call it the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel. In addition, we assume that
the state sequence sn is unknown to the legitimate receiver, whereas the eaves-
dropper always knows which channel is in use.
A (n, Jn) code Cn for the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel W consists of
a stochastic encoder E : Jn → P(A
n) (a stochastic matrix) with a message set
Jn := {1, . . . , Jn} and a collection of mutually disjoint decoding sets {Dj ⊂ B
n :
j ∈ Jn}. The average error probability of a code Cn is given by
e(Cn) := max
sn∈Sn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnsn(D
c
j |x
n) . (2)
A correlated random (n, Jn, Γ, µ) code C
ran
n for the arbitrarily varying wiretap
channel is given by a family of wiretap codes {Cn(γ)}γ∈Γ together with a random
1 P(B) denotes the set of probability distributions on B.
experiment choosing γ according to a distribution µ on Γ . The mean average
error probability of a random (n.Jn, Γ, µ) code C
ran
n is defined analogously to the
ordinary one but with respect to the random experiment choosing γ by
e¯(Crann ) := max
sn∈Sn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
xn∈An
Eγ(xn|j)Wnsn((D
γ
j )
c|xn)µ(γ) .
Definition 2.1. A non-negative number RS is an achievable secrecy rate for
the AVWC W, if there is a sequence (Cn)n∈N of (n, Jn) codes such that
lim
n→∞
e(Cn) = 0 ,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS ,
and
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
I(pJ ;V
n
sn) = 0 , (3)
where J is a uniformly distributed random variable taking values in Jn and
I(pJ ;V
n
sn) is the mutual information of J and the output variable Z
n of the
eavesdropper’s channel V nsn . The secrecy capacity then is given as the supremum
of all achievable secrecy rates RS and is denoted by CS(W).
Analogously we define the secrecy rates and the secrecy capacity for random
codes CS,ran(W), if we replace Cn by C
ran
n in the above definition.
Definition 2.2. A non-negative number RS is an achievable secrecy rate for
correlated random codes for the AVWC W, if there is a sequence (Crann )n∈N of
(n, Jn, Γ, µ) codes such that
lim
n→∞
e¯(Crann ) = 0 ,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn ≥ RS ,
and
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
∑
γ∈Γ
I(pJ , V
n
sn ; C(γ))µ(γ) = 0 , (4)
where I(pJ , V
n
sn ; C(γ)) is the mutual information according to the code C(γ), γ ∈
Γ chosen according to the distribution µ. The secrecy capacity then is given as
the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates RS and is denoted by CS,ran(W).
3 Capacity Results
3.1 Preliminaries
In what follows we use the notation as well as some properties of typical and
conditionally typical sequences from [10]. For p ∈ P(A), W : A → P(B), xn ∈
An, and δ > 0 we denote by T np,δ the set of typical sequences and by T
n
W,δ(x
n)
the set of conditionally typical sequences given xn in the sense of [10].
The basic properties of these sets that are needed in the sequel are summarised
in the following three lemmata.
Lemma 3.1. Fixing δ > 0, for every p ∈ P(A) and W : A→ P(B) we have
p⊗n(T np,δ) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)
|A|2−ncδ
2
W⊗n(T nW,δ(x
n)|xn) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|A||B|2−ncδ
2
for all xn ∈ An with c = 1/(2 ln2). In particular, there is n0 ∈ N such that for
each δ > 0 and p ∈ P(A), W : A→ P(B)
p⊗n(T np,δ) ≥ 1− 2
−nc′δ2
W⊗n(T nW,δ(x
n)|xn) ≥ 1− 2−nc
′δ2
holds with c′ = c2 .
Proof. Standard Bernstein-Sanov trick using the properties of types from [10]
and Pinsker’s inequality. The details can be found in [16] and references therein
for example. ⊓⊔
Recall that for p ∈ P(A) and W : A → P(B), pW ∈ P(B) denotes the output
distribution generated by p and W and that xn ∈ T np,δ and y
n ∈ T nW,δ(x
n) imply
that yn ∈ T n
pW,2|A|δ.
Lemma 3.2. Let xn ∈ T np,δ, then for V : A→ P(C)
|T npV,2|A|δ| ≤ α
−1
V n(zn|xn) ≤ β for all zn ∈ T nV,δ(x
n)
hold, where
α = 2−n(H(pV )+f1(δ)) (5)
β = 2−n(H(V |p)−f2(δ)) (6)
with universal f1(δ), f2(δ) > 0 satisfying limδ→∞ f1(δ) = 0 = limδ→∞ f2(δ).
Proof. Cf. [10].
The next lemma is a standard result from large deviation theory.
Lemma 3.3. (Chernoff bounds) Let Z1, . . . , ZL be i.i.d. random variables with
values in [0, 1] and expectation EZi = µ, and 0 < ǫ <
1
2 . Then it follows that
Pr
{
1
L
L∑
i=1
Zi /∈ [(1± ǫ)µ]
}
≤ 2 exp
(
−L ·
ǫ2µ
3
)
,
where [(1 ± ǫ)µ] denotes the interval [(1− ǫ)µ, (1 + ǫ)µ].
For the optimal random coding strategy of the AVWC we need the robustification
technique by Ahlswede [6] which is formulated as a further lemma. Therefore let
Σn be the group of permutations acting on (1, 2, . . . , n). Then every permutation
σ ∈ Σn induces a bijection π ∈ Πn defined by π : S
n → Sn with π(sn) =
(sσ(1), . . . , sσ(n)) for all s
n = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ S
n and Πn denotes the group of
these bijections.
Lemma 3.4. (Robustification technique) If a function f : Sn → [0, 1] satisfies∑
sn∈Sn
f(sn)q(s1) · . . . · q(sn) ≥ 1− γ (7)
for all q ∈ P0(n,S) and some γ ∈ [0, 1], then
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
f(π(sn)) ≥ 1− 3 · (n+ 1)|S| · γ ∀sn ∈ Sn . (8)
Proof. The proof is given in [6].
To reduce the random code for the AVWC W to a deterministic code we need
the concept of symmetrisability, which was established for ordinary AVCs in the
following representation by [12], [11].
Definition 3.5. [11] An AVC is symmetrisable if for some channel U : A→ S∑
s∈S
W (y|x, s)U(s|x′) =
∑
s∈S
W (y|x′, s)U(s|x) (9)
for all x, x′ ∈ A, y ∈ B.
A new channel defined by (9) then would be symmetric with respect to all
x, x′ ∈ A. The authors of [11] proved the following theorem which is a con-
cretion of Ahlswede’s dichotomy result for single-user AVC, which states that
the deterministic code capacity C is either C = 0 or equals the random code
capacity.
Theorem 3.6. [11] C > 0 if and only if the AVC is non-symmetrisable. If
C > 0, then
C = max
p∈P(A)
min
W∈W¯
I(p,W ) (10)
Here the RHS gives the random code capacity and W¯ denotes the convex closure
of all channels Ws with s ∈ S, S finite or countable.
3.2 Random Code Construction
First let us define the convex hull of the set of channels {Ws : s ∈ S} by the set
of channels {Wq : q ∈ P(S)}, where Wq is defined by
Wq(y|x) =
∑
s∈S
W (y|x, s)q(s), (11)
for all possible distributions q ∈ P(S). Accordingly we define Vq and its convex
hull {Vq : q ∈ P(S)}. Then we denote the convex closure of the set of channels
{(Ws, Vs) : s ∈ S} by W := {(Wq, Vq) : q ∈ P(S˜), S˜ ⊆ S, S˜ is finite}. Occa-
sionally, we restrict q to be from the set of all types P0(n, S) of state sequences
sn ∈ Sn.
Lemma 3.7. The secrecy capacity CS(W) of the arbitrarily varying wiretap
channel AVWC W equals the secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wire-
tap channel W.
Proof. The proof was given for an ordinary arbitrarily varying channel AVC
without secrecy criterion in [10] and for an AVWC under the weak secrecy cri-
terion in [14]. Let W˜1, . . . , W˜n be averaged channels as defined in (11) and a
channel Wnq˜ : A
n → P(Bn) with q˜ =
∏n
i=1 qi, q˜ ∈ P(S
n), qi ∈ P(S) defined by
Wnq˜ (y
n|xn) =
n∏
i=1
W˜i(yi|xi) =
n∏
i=1
Wqi(yi|xi) =
∑
sn∈Sn
Wn(yn|xn, sn)q˜(sn)
If we now use the same (n, Jn) code Cn defined by the same pair of encoder and
decoding sets as for the AVWC W the error probability for transmission of a
single codeword by the channel Wnq˜ is given by∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnq˜ (D
c
j |x
n) =
∑
sn∈Sn
q˜(sn)
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnsn(D
c
j |x
n)
and we can bound the average error probability by
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnq˜ (D
c
j |x
n)
≤ max
sn∈Sn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnsn(D
c
j |x
n) = e(Cn) .
Otherwise, because W is a subset of W
n
, which is the closure of the set of chan-
nels (Wnq˜ , V
n
q˜ ), the opposite inequality holds for the channelW
n
q˜ that maximizes
the error probability. Because V nq˜ is defined analogously to W
n
q˜ , we can define
for the (n, Jn) code
Vˆ (zn|j) :=
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)V nq˜ (z
n|xn) (12)
for all zn ∈ Cn, j ∈ Jn. Then
Vˆ (zn|j) =
∑
sn∈Sn
q˜(sn)
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)V nsn(z
n|xn) =
∑
sn∈Sn
q˜(sn)Vˆ nsn(z
n|j) (13)
and because of the convexity of the mutual information in the channel Vˆ and
(13) it holds that
I(J, Znq˜ ) ≤
∑
sn∈Sn
q˜(sn)I(J ;Znsn) ≤ sup
sn
I(J, Znsn). (14)
Now because {Vˆ nsn(z
n|j) : sn ∈ Sn} is a subset of {Vˆ (zn|j) : q˜ ∈ P(Sn)} we end
in
sup
q˜∈P(Sn)
I(J, Znq˜ ) = sup
sn
I(J, Znsn) .
⊓⊔
Now we can proceed in the construction of the random code of the AVWC W.
Definition 3.8. We call a channel to the eavesdropper a best channel if there
exist a channel Vq∗ ∈ {Vq : q ∈ P(S)} such that all other channels from {Vq :
q ∈ P(S)} are degraded versions of Vq∗ . If we denote the output of any channel
Vq, q ∈ P(S) by Zq it holds that
X → Zq∗ → Zq, ∀q ∈ P(S). (15)
Proposition 3.9. Provided that there exist a best channel to the eavesdropper,
for the random code secrecy capacity CS,ran(W) of the AVWC W it holds that
CS,ran(W) ≥ max
p∈P(A)
( min
q∈P(S)
I(p,Wq)− max
q∈P(S)
I(p, Vq)). (16)
Proof. The proof is based on Ahlswedes robustification technique [6] and is di-
vided in two parts:
step 1 ): The set
W := {(Wnq , V
n
q ) : q ∈ P(S)}
corresponds to a compound wiretap channel indexed by the set of all possible
distributions q ∈ P(S) on the set of states S. First we show, that there exist a
deterministic code for the compound wiretap channel W that achieves the lower
bound on the random code secrecy capacity of the AVWC W given in (16).
In [8] it was shown that for a compound wiretap channel {(Wt, Vt) : t ∈ θ}
without channel state information at the legitimate receivers the secrecy capacity
is bounded from below by
CS,comp ≥ max
p∈P(A)
(min
t∈θ
I(p,Ws)−max
t∈θ
I(p, Vs)). (17)
In accordance with the proof of (17) in [8] we define a set of i.i.d. random
variables {Xjl}j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln] each according to the distribution p
′ ∈ P(An) with
p′(xn) :=
{
p⊗n(xn)
p⊗n(T n
p,δ
) if x
n ∈ T np,δ,
0 otherwise,
(18)
for any p ∈ P(A), and where Jn and Ln are chosen as
Jn = ⌊2
n[infq∈P(S) I(p,Wq)−supq∈P(S) I(p,Vq)−τ ]⌋ (19)
Ln = ⌊2
n[supq∈P(S) I(p,Vq)+
τ
4
]⌋ (20)
with τ > 0. Now we assume that there exist a best channel to the eavesdropper
Vq∗ in contrast to the proof in [8]. Hence by the definition of Vq∗ in (15) and
because the mutual Information I(p, V ) is convex in V and every member of
{Vq}q∈P(S) is a convex combination of the set {Vs}s∈S , it holds that
I(p, Vq∗) = sup
s
I(p, Vs) = sup
q∈P(S)
I(p, Vq) (21)
for all p ∈ P(A). Note that because of (21) for |S| < ∞ Vq∗ ∈ {Vs : s ∈ S},
which means that q∗ is a one-point distribution.
By the definition of the compound channelW the channels to the eavesdrop-
per are of the form
V nq (z
n|xn) :=
n∏
i=1
Vq(zi|xi) (22)
for all q ∈ P(S). Then following the same approach as in the proof in [8] we
define
Q˜q,xn(z
n) = V nq (z
n|xn) · 1T n
Vq,δ
(xn)(z
n),
and
Θ′q(z
n) =
∑
xn∈T n
p,δ
p′(xn)Q˜q,xn(z
n). (23)
for all zn ∈ Cn. Now let B := {zn ∈ Cn : Θ′q(z
n) ≥ ǫαq} where ǫ = 2
−nc′δ2 (cf.
Lemma 3.1) and αq is from (5) in Lemma 3.2 computed with respect to p and Vq.
By Lemma 3.2 the support of Θ′q has cardinality ≤ α
−1
q since for each x
n ∈ T np,δ
it holds that T nVq ,δ(x
n) ⊂ T n
pVq ,2|A|δ
, which implies that
∑
zn∈B Θq(z
n) ≥ 1− 2ǫ,
if
Θq(z
n) = Θ′q(z
n) · 1B(z
n) and
Qq,xn(z
n) = Q˜q,xn(z
n) · 1B(z
n). (24)
Now it is obvious from (23) and the definition of the set B that for any zn ∈ B
Θq(z
n) = EQq,Xjl(z
n) ≥ ǫαq if E is the expectation value with respect to the
distribution p′. Let βq defined as in (6) with respect to Vq. For the random
variables β−1q Qq,Xjl(z
n) define the event
ιj(q) =
⋂
zn∈Cn
{
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
Qq,Xjl(z
n) ∈ [(1± ǫ)Θq(z
n)]
}
, (25)
and keeping in mind that Θq(z
n) ≥ ǫαq for all z
n ∈ B. Then it follows that for
all j ∈ [Jn] and for all s ∈ S
Pr{(ιj(q))
c} ≤ 2|C|n exp
(
− Ln
2−n[I(p,Vq)+g(δ)]
3
)
(26)
by Lemma 3.3, Lemma 3.2, and our choice ǫ = 2−nc
′δ2 with g(δ) := f1(δ) +
f2(δ) + 3c
′δ2. Making δ > 0 sufficiently small we have for all sufficiently large
n ∈ N
Ln2
−n[I(p,Vq)+g(δ)] ≥ 2n
τ
8 .
Thus, for this choice of δ the RHS of (26) is double exponential in n uniformly in
q ∈ P(S) and can be made smaller than ǫJ−1n for all j ∈ [Jn] and all sufficiently
large n ∈ N. I.e.
Pr{(ιj(q))
c} ≤ ǫJ−1n ∀q ∈ P(S) (27)
Now we will show that we can achieve reliable transmission to the legitimate
receiver governed by {(Wnq : q ∈ P(S)} for all messages j ∈ [Jn] when ran-
domising over the index l ∈ Ln but without the need of decoding l ∈ [Ln]. To
this end define X = {Xjl}j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln] to be the set of random variables with
Xjl are i.i.d. according to p
′ defined in (18). Define now the random decoder
{Dj(X )}j∈[Jn] ⊆ B
n analogously as in [8], [7]. Then it was shown by the au-
thors, that there exist a sequence of (n, Jn) codes for the compound wiretap
channel in the particular case without CSI with arbitrarily small mean average
error
EX (λ
(q)
n (X )) ≤ 2
−na
for all q ∈ P(S) and sufficiently large n ∈ N. Additionally we define for each
q ∈ P(S)
ι0(q) = {λ
(q)
n (X )) ≤ 2
−na2 } (28)
and set
ι :=
⋂
q∈P0(n,S)
Jn⋂
j=0
ιj(q) (29)
Then with (27), (28) and applying the union bound we obtain
Pr{ιc} ≤ 2−nc
for a suitable positive constant c > 0 and all sufficiently large n ∈ N (Cf. [8]).
Hence, we have shown that there exist realisations {xjl} of {X
n
jl}j∈[Jn],l∈[Ln] such
that xjl ∈ ι for all j ∈ [Jn] and l ∈ [Ln]. Now following the same argumentation
as in [8], [7] we obtain that there is a sequence of (n, Jn) codes that for all
codewords {xjl} it follows by construction that
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln
∑
l∈[Ln]
Wnq (D
c
j |xjl) ≤ 2
−na′ (30)
is fulfilled for n ∈ N sufficiently large and for all q ∈ P(S) with a′ > 0. So we
have found a (n, Jn) code with average error probability upper bounded by (30).
Further, for the given code and a random variable J uniformly distributed on
the message set {1, . . . , Jn} it holds that
I(pJ ;V
n
q ) ≤ ǫ
′ (31)
uniformly in q ∈ P(S). Both (30) and (31) ensure that in the scenario of the
compound wiretap channel W the legitimate receiver can identify each message
j from the message set {1, . . . , Jn} with high probability, while at the same
time the eavesdropper receives almost no information about it. That is, that all
numbers RS with
RS ≤ inf
q∈P(S)
I(p,Wq)− sup
q∈P(S)
I(p, Vq) (32)
are achievable secrecy rates of the compound wiretap channel W.
step 2 ): Robustification : In the second step we derive from the deterministic
(n, Jn) code for the above mentioned compound wiretap channel W a (n, Jn)
random code Crann for the AVWC W, which achieves the same secrecy rates. We
note first that by (21) and (31)
max
sn∈Sn
I(pJ , Vsn) = I(pJ , V
n
q∗) ≤ ǫ
′, (33)
which means, that, due to the assumption of a best channel to the eavesdropper,
the code achieving the secrecy rate for the best channel to the eavesdropper
fulfills the secrecy criterion for a channel with any state sequence sn ∈ Sn. Now,
as already mentioned we use the robustification technique (cf. Lemma 3.4) to
derive from the deterministic code CW = {xjl, Dj : j ∈ [Jn], l ∈ [Ln]} of the
compound wiretap channel W the random code for the AVWC W. Therefore,
for now let S to be finite. With (30) it holds that
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln
∑
l∈[Ln]
∑
sn∈Sn
Wn(Dj |xjl, s
n)q⊗n(sn) ≥ 1− 2−na
′
(34)
for all q⊗n =
∏n
i=1 q and in particular for all q ∈ P0(n, S). Now let π ∈ Πn be
the bijection on Sn induced by the permutation σ ∈ Σn. Since (7) is fulfilled
with
f(sn) =
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln
∑
l∈[Ln]
Wn(Dj |xjl, s
n) (35)
it follows from (8) that
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
1
Jn
∑
j∈[Jn]
1
Ln
∑
l∈[Ln]
Wn(Dj |xjl, π(s
n)) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|S|2−na
′
(36)
for all sn ∈ Sn. Hence by defining Cpi := {π−1(xnjl), π
−1(Dj)} as a member
of a family of codes {Cpi}pi∈Πn together with a random variable K distributed
according to µ as the uniform distribution on Πn, (36) is equivalent to
Eµ(λ¯n(C
K ,Wnsn)) ≤ (n+ 1)
|S|2−na
′
=: λn (37)
with λ¯n(C
pi,Wnsn) as the respective average error probability for K = π and it
holds for all sn ∈ Sn. Thus we have shown that
Crann := {(π
−1(xjl), π
−1(Dj)) : j ∈ [Jn], l ∈ [Ln], π ∈ Πn, µ} (38)
is a (n, Jn, Πn, µ) random code for the AVC channel W
n = {Wsn : s
n ∈ Sn}
with the mean average error probability Eµ(λ¯n(C
K ,Wnsn)) upper bounded by λn
as in (37).
Now it is easily seen that
pC
pi
JZn
q∗
(j, zn) =
1
Jn
1
Ln
Ln∑
l=1
V nq∗(π
−1(zn)|π−1(xjl)) = pJZn
q∗
. (39)
Actually, it still holds that
pC
r
JZn
q∗
(j, zn) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
pC
pi
JZn
q∗
(j, zn) = pJZn
q∗
. (40)
With (39) and the representation of the mutual information by the information
divergence we obtain from (33)
Eµ(D(p
CK
JZn
q∗
||pJ ⊗ p
CK
Zn
q∗
)) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
D(pC
pi
JZn
q∗
||pJ ⊗ p
Cpi
Zn
q∗
)
=
1
n!
∑
pi∈Πn
D(pJZn
q∗
||pJ ⊗ pZn
q∗
) = I(pJ , V
n
q∗) ≤ ǫ
′ .
(41)
Thus we have constructed a random (n, Jn, Γ, µ) code C
ran
n with mean average
error probability bounded for all sn ∈ Sn as in (37) and which fulfills the strong
secrecy criterion almost surely, provided that there exist a best channel to the
eavesdropper. By the construction of the random code it follows that the secrecy
rates given by (32) for the compound wiretap channel W achieved by the deter-
ministic code CW are achievable secrecy rates for the AVWC W with random
code Crann . That is, we have shown that all rates RS with
RS ≤ max
p∈P(A)
( min
q∈P(S)
I(p,Wq)− max
q∈P(S)
I(p, Vq)) . (42)
are achievable secrecy rates of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel AVWC
with random code Crann . ⊓⊔
3.3 Deterministic Code Construction
Because the code Cpi that is used for the transmission of a single message is
subjected to a random selection, reliable transmission can only be guaranteed if
the outcome of the random experiment can be shared by both the transmitter
and the receiver. One way to inform the receiver about the code that is chosen is
to add a short prefix to the actual codeword. Provided that the number of codes
is small enough, the transmission of these additional prefixes causes no essential
loss in rate. In the following we use the elimination technique by Ahlswede [2]
which has introduced the above approach to derive deterministic codes from ran-
dom codes for determining capacity of arbitrarily varying channels. Temporarily
we drop the requirement of a best channel to the eavesdropper and state the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.10. 1. Assume that for the AVWCW it holds that CS,ran(W) > 0.
Then the secrecy capacity CS(W) equals its random code secrecy capacity
CS,ran(W),
CS(W) = CS,ran(W), (43)
if and only if the channel to the legitimate receiver is non-symmetrisable.
2. If CS,ran(W) = 0 it always holds that CS(W) = 0.
First, if the channel to the legitimate receiver is symmetrisable then the de-
terministic code capacity of the channel to the legitimate receiver equals zero
by Theorem 3.6 and no reliable transmission of messages is possible. Hence the
deterministic code secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel
also equals zero although the random code secrecy capacity could be greater
than zero. So we can restrict to the case in which the channel to the legitimate
receiver is non-symmetrisable. If CS(W) = CS,ran(W) > 0, then the channel
to the legitimate receiver must be nonsymmetrisable. For the other direction,
because the secrecy capacity of the AVWC W cannot be greater than the ran-
dom code secrecy capacity it suffices to show that C({Wsn}) > 0 implies that
CS(W) ≥ CS,ran(W). Here C({Wsn}) denotes the capacity of the arbitrarily
varying channels to the legitimate receiver without secrecy. The proof is given
in the two paragraphs Random code reduction and Elimination of randomness.
Random Code Reduction We first reduce the random code Cran to a new ran-
dom code selecting only a small number of deterministic codes from the former,
and averaging over this codes gives a new random code with a constant small
mean average error probability, which additionally fulfills the secrecy criterion.
Lemma 3.11. (Random Code Reduction) Let C(Z) be a random code for the
AVWC W consisting of a family {C(γ)}γ∈Γ of wiretap codes where γ is chosen
according to the distribution µ of Z. Then let
e¯(Crann ) = max
sn
Eµe(s
n|C(Z)) ≤ λn and, max
sn
EµI(pJ , Vsn ; C(Z)) ≤ ǫ
′
n .
(44)
Then for any ǫ and K satisfying
ǫ > 4max{λn, ǫ
′
n} and K >
2n log |A|
ǫ
(1 + n log |S|) (45)
there exist K deterministic codes Ci, i = 1, . . . ,K chosen from the random code
by random selection such that
1
K
K∑
i=1
e(sn|Ci) ≤ ǫ and
1
K
K∑
i=1
I(pJ , Vsn ; Ci) ≤ ǫ (46)
for all sn ∈ Sn.
Proof. The proof is analogue to the proof of Lemma 6.8 [10], where a similar
assertion in terms of the maximal probability of error for single user AVCs with-
out secrecy criterion is established. Cf. also [2]. Let Z be the random variable
distributed according to µ on Γ for the (n, Jn, Γ, µ) random code. Now consider
K independent repetitions of the random experiment of code selections accord-
ing to µ and call the according random variables Zi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Then for
any sn ∈ Sn it holds that
Pr
{ 1
K
K∑
i=1
e(sn|C(Zi)) ≥ ǫ or
1
K
K∑
i=1
I(pJ , Vsn ; C(Zi)) ≥ ǫ
}
≤ Pr
{
exp
K∑
i=1
e(sn|C(Zi))
n log |A|
≥ exp
Kǫ
n log |A|
}
+Pr
{
exp
K∑
i=1
I(pJ , Vsn ; C(Zi))
n log |A|
≥ exp
Kǫ
n log |A|
}
,
and by Markov’s inequality
Pr
{ 1
K
K∑
i=1
e(sn|C(Zi)) ≥ ǫ or
1
K
K∑
i=1
I(pJ , Vsn ; C(Zi)) ≥ ǫ
}
≤ exp
(
−
Kǫ
n log |A|
)
E exp
K∑
i=1
e(sn|C(Zi))
n log |A|
+exp
(
−
Kǫ
n log |A|
)
E exp
K∑
i=1
I(pJ , Vsn ; C(Zi))
n log |A|
.
Now because of the independency of the random variables Zi and because all Zi
are distributed as Z and we have exp t ≤ 1 + t, for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 (exp to the base
2), we can give the following upper bounds
(
E exp
e(sn|C(Z))
n log |A|
)K
≤
(
1 + E
e(sn|C(Z))
n log |A|
)K
≤
(
1 +
λn
n log |A|
)K
(47)
and
(
E exp
I(pJ , Vsn ; C(Z))
n log |A|
)K
≤
(
1 + E
I(pJ , Vsn ; C(Z))
n log |A|
)K
≤
(
1 +
ǫ′n
n log |A|
)K
.
(48)
Hence we obtain for any sn ∈ Sn
Pr
{ 1
K
K∑
i=1
e(sn|C(Zi)) ≥ ǫ or
1
K
K∑
i=1
I(pJ , Vsn ; C(Zi)) ≥ ǫ}
≤ exp
[
−K
( ǫ
n log |A|
− log(1 +
λn
n log |A|
)
)]
+ exp
[(
−K(
ǫ
n log |A|
− log(1 +
ǫ′n
n log |A|
)
)]
≤ 2 exp
[
−K
( ǫ
n log |A|
− log(1 + max{
λn
n log |A|
,
ǫ′n
n log |A|
})
)]
.
Then
Pr
{ 1
K
K∑
i=1
e(sn|C(Zi)) ≤ ǫ and
1
K
K∑
i=1
I(pJ , Vsn ; C(Zi)) ≤ ǫ, ∀s
n ∈ Sn
}
≥ 1− 2|S|n exp
[
−K
( ǫ
n log |A|
− log(1 + max{
λn
n log |A|
,
ǫ′n
n log |A|
})
)]
,
(49)
which is strictly positive, if we choose
ǫ ≥ 2n log |A| log(1 + max{
λn
n log |A|
,
ǫ′n
n log |A|
})
and
K ≥
2 log |A|
ǫ
(n+ n2 log |S|) . (50)
Now because for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and log to the base 2 it holds that
t ≤ log(1 + t) ≤ 2t ,
we increase the lower bound for choosing ǫ if
ǫ ≥ 4max{λn, ǫ
′
n} .
and with (50) the assertion of (49) still holds. Hence, we have shown that there
exist K realisations Ci := C(Zi = γi), γi ∈ Γ , i ∈ {1, . . . ,K} of the random code,
which build a new reduced random code with uniform distribution on these codes
with mean average error probability and mean secrecy criterion fulfilled by (46).
⊓⊔
Now, if we assume that the channel to the legitimate receiver is non-
symmetrisable, which means that C({Wsn}) > 0, and that there exist a random
code Crann that achieves the random code capacity CS,ran(W) > 0, then there
exist a sequence of random (n, Jn) codes with
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
xn∈An
Eγ(xn|j) ·Wnsn((D
γ
j )
c|xn)µ(γ) = 0 ,
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log Jn → CS,ran(W) > 0,
and
lim
n→∞
max
sn∈Sn
∑
γ∈Γ
I(pJ ;V
n
sn ; C(γ))µ(γ) = 0. (51)
Then on account of the random code reduction lemma there exist a sequence of
random (n, Jn) codes consisting only of n
3 deterministic codes (cf. (45)) chosen
from the former random code, and it holds for any ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n
that
max
sn∈Sn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
∑
xn∈An
Ei(xn|j)Wnsn((D
i
j)
c|xn) ≤ ǫ (52)
and
max
sn∈Sn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
I(pJ ;V
n
sn ; Ci) ≤ ǫ, (53)
where Ci = {(E
i
j , D
i
j), j ∈ Jn}, i = 1, . . . , n
3, and Ei is the stochastic encoder of
the deterministic wiretap code. Then the reduced random code consists of the
family of codes {Ci}i∈{1,...,n3} together with the uniform distribution µ
′(i) = 1
n3
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n3}.
Elimination of randomness (Cf. Theorem 6.11 in [10])
Now if there exist a deterministic code and C({Wsn}) > 0 then there exist a
code
{xkni , Fi ⊂ B
kn : i = 1, . . . n3} (54)
where xkni is chosen according to an encoding function fi : {1, . . . , n
3} → Akn
with kn
n
→ 0 as n→∞ with error probability
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
W kn(F ci |x
kn
i , s
kn) ≤ ǫ (55)
for any ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large n (cf. (52)) for all skn ∈ Skn . If we now
compose a new deterministic code for the AVWC W by prefixing the codewords
of each Ci
{fiE
i
j , Fi ×D
i
j : i = 1, . . . , n
3, j ∈ [Jn]} =: C , (56)
the decoder is informed of which encoder Ei is in use for the actual message j if
he identifies the prefix correctly. Note that for the transmission of the prefix only
the reliability is of interest, because it contains no information about the message
j ∈ Jn to be sent. Now the new codewords has a length of kn + n, transmit a
message from {1, . . . , n3} × Jn, where the channel which is determined by the
state sequence skn+n ∈ Skn+n yields an average error probability of
λ¯n(C,W
(kn+n)
skn+n
) ≤
1
n3Jn
n3∑
i=1
∑
j∈[Jn]
(λi + λj(i))
≤
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
λi +
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
en(s
n, Ci) ≤ 2ǫ.
(57)
Here, for each skn ∈ Skn λi means the error probability for transmitting i from
{1, . . . , n3} encoded in xkni by W
kn
skn
followed by the transmission of j, where the
codeword is chosen according to the stochastic encoder Eij , over the last n chan-
nel realisations determined by sn with error probability λj(i). This construction
is possible due to the memorylessness of the channel.
Now if we turn to the security part of the transmission problem it is easily
seen that
pC
JZ
kn+n
skn+n
(j, zkn+n) =
1
Jn
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
V kn
skn
(zˆkn |xkni )
∑
xn
Ei(xn|j)V nsn(z
n|xn)
=
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
V kn
skn
(zˆkn |xkni ) · p
Ci
JZn
sn
,
(58)
where zˆkn are the first kn components of z
kn+n. With (58) and the representation
of the mutual information by the information divergence we obtain that
D(pC
JZ
kn+n
skn+n
||pJ ⊗ p
C
Z
kn+n
skn+n
)
= D
( 1
n3
n3∑
i=1
V kn
skn
(zˆkn |xkni )p
Ci
JZn
sn
∥∥∥ 1
n3
n3∑
i=1
V kn
skn
(zˆkn |xkni )pJ ⊗ p
Ci
Zn
sn
)
≤
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
D
(
V kn
skn
(zˆkn |xkni )p
Ci
JZn
sn
∥∥V kn
skn
(zˆkn |xkni )pJ ⊗ p
Ci
Zn
sn
)
=
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
D
(
pCiJZn
sn
∥∥pJ ⊗ pCiZn
sn
)
=
1
n3
n3∑
i=1
I(pJ , V
n
sn ; Ci) ≤ ǫ
(59)
for all sn ∈ Sn and n ∈ N sufficiently large, where the first inequality follows
because for two probability distributions p, q the relative entropy D(p‖q) is a
convex function in the pair (p, q) and the last inequality follows by the random
code reduction lemma.
Because kn
n
→ 0 as n→∞
lim
n→∞
1
kn + n
log(n3Jn) = lim
n→∞
(
1
n
log Jn +
1
n
log(n3)) = lim
n→∞
1
n
log Jn , (60)
Cn is a deterministic (n, Jn) code which achieves the same rates as the random
code Crann and so the random code capacity CS,ran as given in (51), provided that
the channel to the legitimate receiver is non-symmetrisable.
Thus, with {1, . . . , Jn} as the message set, Cn is a deterministic (n+o(n), n
3 ·
Jn) code with average error probability bounded for all s
kn+n ∈ Skn+n as in (57)
and which fulfills the strong secrecy criterion as in (59), and which achieves the
random code secrecy capacity CS,ran of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channels
AVWC W which implies that CS = CS,ran. This concludes the proof.
Note that in the case in which the channel to the legitimate receiver is non-
symmetrisable and we know that the deterministic code secrecy capacity CS(W)
equals zero we can conclude that the random code secrecy capacity CS,ran(W)
equals zero. As a consequence of the theorem we can state the following assertion.
Corollary 3.12. The deterministic code secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily vary-
ing wiretap channel W, provided that there exists a best channel to the eaves-
dropper and under the assumption that the channel to the legitimate receiver is
non-symmetrisable, is lower bounded by
CS(W) ≥ max
p∈P(A)
( min
q∈P(S)
I(p,Wq)− max
q∈P(S)
I(p, Vq)) .
Proof. Combine the assertions of Proposition 3.9 and Theorem 3.10. ⊓⊔
3.4 Upper bound on the capacity of the AVWC W and a
multi-letter coding theorem
In this section we give an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of the AVWC
W which corresponds to the bound for the compound wiretap channel built by
the same family of channels. In addition we give the proof of the multi-letter
converse of the AVWC W.
Theorem 3.13. The secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel
AVWC W is upper bounded,
CS(W) ≤ min
q∈P(S)
max
U→X→(Y Z)q
(I(U, Yq)− I(U,Zq)) . (61)
Proof. By Lemma 3.7 the capacity of the AVWC W equals the capacity of the
AVWC W. Obviously, the set W = {(W⊗nq , V
⊗n
q ) : q ∈ P(S)} which describes
a compound wiretap channel is a subset of W
n
= {(Wnq˜ , V
n
q˜ ) : q˜ ∈ P(S
n), q˜ =∏n
i=1 qi}. Now, because we can upper bound the secrecy capacity of the AVWC
W by the secrecy capacity of the worst wiretap channel in the family W
n
, to-
gether with the foregoing we can upper bound it by the capacity of the worst
channel of the compound channel W . Hence,
CS(W) = CS(W) ≤ inf
q˜
CS((W
n
q˜ , V
n
q˜ ))
≤ inf
q
CS((W
n
q , V
n
q )) = inf
q
CS(Wq, Vq) ,
The minimum is attained because of the continuity of CS(Wq , Vq) on the compact
set W. ⊓⊔
Remark 3.14. Consider the special case of an AVWC W = {(Wsn , Vrn) :
sn ∈ Sn1 , r
n ∈ Sn2 }, where both the state of the main channel s ∈ S1 and
the state of the eavesdropper’s channel r ∈ S2 in every time step can be
chosen independently. In addition let us assume that there exist a channel
Wq∗1 ∈ {Wq1 : q1 ∈ P(S1)}, which is a degraded version of all other chan-
nels from {Wq1 : q1 ∈ P(S1)}, and a best channel to the eavesdropper Vq∗2 from
the set {Vq2 : q2 ∈ P(S2)} (cf. Definition 3.8). Then in accordance with Sec-
tion 3.5 of [8] the lower bound on the secrecy capacity given in Corollary 3.12
matches the upper bound from Theorem 3.13. Thus we can conclude that under
the assumption, that the channel to legitimate receiver is non-symmetrisable,
the capacity of the AVWC W is given by
CS(W) = max
p∈P(A)
(I(p,Wq∗1 )− I(p, Vq∗2 )) .
Now in addition to Theorem 3.13 we give a multi-letter formula of the upper
bound of the secrecy rates. Therefore we need the following lemma used in
analogy to Lemma 3.7 in [8].
Lemma 3.15. For the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel AVWC Wn the limit
lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→(Y nZn)q˜
( inf
q˜∈P(Sn)
I(U, Y nq˜ )− sup
q˜∈P(Sn)
I(U,Znq˜ ))
exists.
The proof is carried out in analogy to Lemma 3.7 in [8] and therefore omitted.
Theorem 3.16. The secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel
AVWC W is upper bounded by
CS(W) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→(Y nZn)q˜
( inf
q˜∈P(Sn)
I(U, Y nq˜ )− sup
q˜∈P(Sn)
I(U,Znq˜ )) , (62)
where q˜ =
∏n
i=1 qi, qi ∈ P(S) and Y
n
q˜ , Z
n
q˜ are the outputs of the channels W
n
q˜
and V nq˜ respective.
Proof. Let (Cn)n∈N be any sequence of (n, Jn) codes such that with
sup
sn∈Sn
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnsn(D
c
j |x
n) =: ε1,n and, sup
sn∈Sn
I(J, Znsn) =: ε2,n
it holds that limn→∞ ε1,n0 = and limn→∞ ε2,n, where J denotes the random
variable which is uniformly distributed on the message set Jn. Because of Lemma
3.7 we obtain that for the same sequences of (n, Jn) codes
lim
n→∞
sup
q˜∈P(Sn)
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)Wnq˜ (D
c
j |x
n) = lim
n→∞
ε1,n = 0 (63)
and
lim
n→∞
sup
q˜∈P(Sn)
I(J, Znq˜ ) = lim
n→∞
ε2,n = 0 . (64)
Now let us denote another random variable by Jˆ with values in Jn determined
by the Markov chain J → Xn → Y nq˜ → Jˆ , where the first transition is governed
by E, the second by Wnq˜ , and the last by the decoding rule. Now the proof is
analogue to the proof of Proposition 3.8 in [8]. For any q˜ ∈ P(Sn) we have from
data processing and Fano’s inequality
(1− ε1,n) log Jn ≤ I(J, Y
n
q˜ ) + 1.
We then use the validity of the secrecy criterion (64) to derive
(1− ε1,n) log Jn ≤ I(J, Y
n
q˜ )− sup
q˜
I(J, Znq˜ ) + ε2,n + 1
for any q˜ ∈ P(Sn). Since the LHS does not depend on q˜ we end in
(1− ε1,n) log Jn ≤ max
U→Xn→Y nq˜ Z
n
q˜
(inf
q˜
I(U, Y nq˜ )− sup
q˜
I(U,Znq˜ )) + ε2,n + 1 .
Dividing by n ∈ N and taking lim sup concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Now if we consider the set W = {(W⊗nq , V
⊗n
q ) : q ∈ P(S)} as a subset of
W
n
= {(Wnq˜ , V
n
q˜ ) : q˜ ∈ P(S
n), q˜ =
∏n
i=1 qi} and the same sequence (Cn)n∈N of
(n, Jn) codes for the AVWC W for which (63) and (64) holds, we can conclude
that
lim
n→∞
sup
q∈P(S)
1
Jn
Jn∑
j=1
∑
xn∈An
E(xn|j)W⊗nq (D
c
j |x
n) ≤ lim
n→∞
ε1,n (65)
and
lim
n→∞
sup
q∈P(S)
I(J, Znq ) ≤ lim
n→∞
ε2,n , (66)
with ε1,n and ε2,n as above. Then we can conclude with the same argumentation
as in the previous proof,
Corollary 3.17. The secrecy capacity of the arbitrarily varying wiretap channel
AVWC W is upper bounded by
CS(W) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→(Y nZn)q
( inf
q∈P(S)
I(U, Y nq )− sup
q∈P(S)
I(U,Znq )) ,
where q ∈ P(S) and Y nq , Z
n
q are the outputs of the channels W
⊗n
q and V
⊗n
q
respective.
Now, using standard arguments concerning the use of the channels defined by
PYq|U = Wq · PX|U and PZq|U = Vq · PX|U instead of Wq and Vq and applying
the assertion of Corollary 3.12 to the n-fold product of channels Wq and Vq, we
are able to give the coding theorem for the multi-letter case of the AVWC with
a best channel to the eavesdropper.
Theorem 3.18. Provided that there exist a best channel to the eavesdropper,
the multi-letter expression for the secrecy capacity CS(W) of the AVWC W is
given by
CS(W) = lim
n→∞
1
n
max
U→Xn→(Y nZn)q
( inf
q∈P(S)
I(U, Y nq )− sup
q∈P(S)
I(U,Znq )) ,
if the channel to the legitimate receiver is non-symmetrisable, and is zero other-
wise.
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